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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
OPAL WHITLOCK,
Plaintiff and Respondents,
OLD AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 11019

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Nature of The Case

The nature of this case amounts to the interpretalion of an insurance policy. The issue date of the policy
was 3 April 1961, in which Old American Insurance Company, defendant and appellant, issued a limited policy
to the insured Arthur Whitlock, General Delivery, Enterprise, Utah, with the beneficiary, Opal Whitlock his
wife. Arthur Whitlock had purchased this policy which
was a very limited accident insurance policy which
contained the provision Part Three:
"This policy does not cover any loss or disability
resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part,
from {a) any mental or bodily sickness or disease .. "
Mr. Whitlock died in the Iron County Hospital on
or about the 18th day of October, 1962, after having
been under disability for several months from an operation in which one lung had been removed because of
cancer. At the time of the death, Mr. Whitlock had been
suffering from cancer, and on the 24th of September,
1962, was involved in an automobile accident while enroute to the Iron City Hospital for either a cold or the
('ancer, as the case may be, in an automobile driven by
his son. He was in the hospital until the 18th day of
1

October, 1962, at which time he died. The death certificate said "Metastatic Carcinoma" which is cancer and
made no mention whatsoever of any injury as a resuit
of the accident. Later on in preparation of the lawsuit
plaintiff submitted four claims P .. Ex. 5, G, 7 and 8, i~
which the principal cause of death was listed as metastatic carcinoma, with the secondary e:ause of death in
three of them listed as injuries from the accident. The
defendant insurance company tendered $2'72.00 for hospitalization, under the theory that he had been in the
hospital because of the accident, but refused to pay
$2400.00 for loss of life benefit under the terms of the
policy. The primary question to be determined under the
terms of this policy was whether or not the death was
under the loss of life provisions of the policy.

Disposition in Lower Court
This case was tried before a jury in Parowan, Iron
County, State of Utah on 21 December, 1966. The jury
brought in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2400.
Thereafter a judgment in line with this verdict, or a
judgment on the verdict was entered after defendant
had filed a motion for judgment n. o. v. and an alternative motion for a new trial, both of which were denied
by the trial court.

Relief Sought on Appeal
The defendant-appellant seeks a modification of this
judgment in that instead of being a judgment for $2400.00, same should be a judgment against the defendantappellant in the sum of $272.00 without interest and less
costs of court and costs of appeal incurred by the defentant-appellant, the defendant insurance company having
previously tendered the $272.00 within a reasonable period after the hospitalization of Arthur Whitlock.

Statement of Facts
It is the position of the defendant-appellant that the

facts in the above entitled matter are as follows: That
the policy which is the subject matter of this action was
a policy of Old American Insurance Company, 4900 Oak
Street, Kansas City, Missouri, being Policy Number V36,810 issued to the insured, Arthur Whitlock, General De·
liv~ry, Enterprise, Utah, Beneficiary, Opal Whitlock,
wife, and that plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is a true and correct
2

copy of said policy. Said policy makes a provision for
the payment of loss of life benefit of $2400.00 with the
further provision that in the event this is paid, it is in
lieu of all othet benefits. That said policy was very limited, being for a very minor premium, to-wit, $12.00 a
year. Part Three thereof, under the heading of Exclusions reads as follows:
"This policy does not cover any loss or disability
resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part,
from (a) any mental or bodily sickness or disease,
or (b) intoxication of the Insured, or (c) war or any
act incident thereto, or (d) bodily injuries sustained
while engaged as a volunteer or paid fireman or law
enforcement officer, or (e) while driving or riding
in any automobile engaged in a race or speed test,
or (f) while driving any automobile for compensation or hire; nor does it cover (g) any period of disability during which the Insured is not under the
regular care of a licensed physician, surgeon or osteopath."
The interpretation of these exclusions is the material
matter of this particular case. The insured, Arthur Whitlock, had been operated on for cancer approximately
May of 1962. He was incapacitated at the time and after
the i·emoval of a lung because of cancer, the insured,
Arthur Whitlock, went home to pass his remaining days,
and on or about the 24th day of September, 1962, he had
his son take him to Cedar City for a check up. Shortly
before the vehicle in which they were traveling arrived
at Cedar City, Utah, it was involved in an accident. Thereafter, Mr. Whitlock was hospitalized until on or about
the 18th day of October, 1962, at which time he expired.
A doctor, A. L. Graff, M. D., of Cedar City, Iron County,
State of Utah, signed a death certificate in the following language: "Metastatic Carcinoma", and in a layman's language, the cause of death as shown by the
death certificate was lung cancer. With lung cancer
being the cause of death, this does not come under the
provisions of the policy hereinabove identified, and payment provisions for loss of life have never become effective. The defendant did tender $272.00 for hospitalization as a result of the accident, which has not been
cashed and has not been returned. The cause of death
wus such that it did not come under the provisions of
the insurance policy for payment of the loss of life benefits of said policy.
3

ARGUMENT
Point 1

THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE EITHER TO SUBSTANTIATE VERDICT
OR TO PLACE DEATH UNDER SAID INSURANCE
POLICY.
Very probably the basic question in connection with
this matter is whether or not the cause of death was such
that it could be interpreted as under the policy. This
policy which was before the trial court and which is before the Supreme Court as Exhibit No. 1, across its face
bears the stamp "THIS IS A LIMITED POLICY, READ
IT CAREFULLY," and "THIS POLICY PROVIDES BENEFITS FOR LOSS OF LIFE, LIMB, SIGHT OR TIME
AND HOSPITALIZATION FROM ACCIDENTAL BODILY INJURY, TO THE EXTENT HEREIN PROVIDED."
Under the heading "Loss of Life" the policy makes
the following statement:
"LOSS OF LIFE. When injuries sustained as the result of any accident covered by this policy cause the
loss of the Insured's life within thirty days from the
date of the accident, the Company will pay the
amount specified therefor in the Amount of Benefits Schedule. Such payment shall be in lieu of all
other benefits under the policy."
Thereafter, under the heading, "Part Three, Exclusions" there is the following statement:
"This policy does ~cover any loss or disability
resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part,
from (a) any mental or bodily sickness or disease,
or (b) intoxication of the Insured, or (c) war or
any act incident thereto, or ( d) bodily injuries sustained while engaged as a volunteer or paid fireman
or law enforcement officer, or (e) while driving or
riding in any automobile engaged in a race or speed
test, or (f) while driving any automobile for compensation or hire; nor does it cover (g) any period
of disability during which the Insured is not under
the regular care of a licensed physician, surgeon or
osteopath."
While the trial court found, with the jury verdict,
that plaintiff should recover $2400.00, which in effect
means that the trial court found that the death did come
within the provisions of the policy, and to do this it
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would have to find that the death did not in any way
"directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from any
mental or bodily sickness or disease," it is extremely
hard to reconcile a finding of this nature with the facts.
It was admitted quite freely by all parties that the insured was dying from cancer. The death certificate was
put in evidence as Defendant's Exhibit No. 3, and said
death certificate bears no reference to any cause except
the cancer.
The only qualified person who testified concerning
the cause of death was Dr. A. L. Graff who was also the
doctor who signed the death certificate. In relation to
this matter, there was never any question in Dr. Graff's
entire testimony but that the cancer, if not the exclusive cause of death, was at least a contributing cause of
death. In the Reporter's transcript of testimony which
has been included in the Designation of Record in the
above entitled matter, Dr. Graff's testimony runs from
Page 63 to Page 91. Dr. Graff had known Mr. Whitlock
for ten or fifteen years before death. This may be found
in Reporter's transcript beginning on Line 17 of Page
63, in which Dr. Graff was asked, in line 20, "How long
did you know Mr. Whitlock?" by counsel, and the answer
was, "Oh, ten of fifteen years, I imagine." Then on Page
65, plaintiff's attorney asked, on Line 22, "Doctor, over
the period of time, what did you observe with respect
to his symptoms and--", and the answer, commencing
on Line 24, is as follows, "Well, I knew he had cancer of
the lung, which had been operated on, metastasis of the
liver." In relation to the injury having anything to do
with the death, on cross-examination, Page 67, Line
2, the doctor was asked, "What was the extent of the
skull injuries?" And his answer was, on Line 3, "Well,
the only thing that demonstrated was the external hema to ma and then the fact he was knocked out, so he told
me. He was out, so he had a concussion, naturally." And
upon being cross-examined about the death certificate,
the following questions and answers took place, beginning on Page 69, on Line 25 of the transcript of the testimony:
Q Doctor, look closer at this document. Right here,
(indicating) you have immediate cause of death, 18-a.
A Yes.
Q How do you pronounce those words?
A Metastatic carcinoma.
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Q What does this mean?

A Carcinoma travels from the original site, which
was the lung, to the other parts of the body; and the ones
I could feel was the liver, and it could have been through
the brain, but I am not sure.
Q Then, can you tell me what that is?
A Well, that is carcinoma.
Q What does that all mean when we take the medical terminology out of it and put it where we understand
it?
A Well, it means he had a cancer of the lung and
they had removed it; but before they removed it, part
of the cancer cells had scattered into other parts of the
body.
Q And, in other words, the immediate cause of death
in your death certificate was cancer?
A That is what I put down.
Then concerning other parts of the death certificate, on Page 70 of the transcript, Line 29, the doctor
was asked the question, "Now, I call your attention here
to Part 2 under Item 18, 'Other significant conditions
contributing to death but not related to the terminal
disease condition given in Part 1-a above.' What did
you write in there?" And his answer, Page 71, Line 2,
was, "Well, there isn't any writing in there. I wrote it
down below here. (Indicating.)"
A complete examination of the testimony of Dr.
Graff shows that at no time did he ever feel that the
cancer was not a contributing factor to the death, even
though it was quite apparent that he was attempting to
testify in favor of the plaintiff. There is no question that
the doctor, at the time of signing the death certificate,
felt that the cancer was the cause of death. In interpret·
ing the hospital records that were offered in evidence
as defendant's Exhibit 4, Page 86 of the transcript, commencing on Line 12, and running through line 19, the
doctor was asked, "Now, Doctor, I call your attention
to the first page in the record as it now stands after the
other sheet has been removed. Would you examine that,
please and on the right side under Systematic Review,
there is the notation, 'The cancer in liner enlarged very
rapidly and patient finally died.' Is that in your hand
writing?" The answer was, "That is." Then at the bot·
tom of Page 86, on line 30, the doctor \Vas asked, " 'Physical findings, metastatic carcinoma of liner can be felt,
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pulse rapid and weak.' Is that in your hand writing?"
The answer, Page 87, Line 2, was "Yes, sir."
Thereafter, there was a discussion on the word
"liner" and it became clarified that the witness meant'
"liver."
When one compares the nature of Dr. Graff's testimony with the language of the policy, it becomes quite
apparent that even under conditions in which Dr. Graff
was attempting to make a very favorable impression
for the plaintiff, he could not at any time testify that
the cancer was not at least a contributing factor to the
cause of death. Under these conditions, the exclusion provisions of the policy takes the death out from under the provisions of the policy and even under the most
favorable interpretation there should be no payment of
death benefits under this policy.
Point II
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 SUBMITTED THE CASE TO
THE JURY ON A STANDARD DIFFERENT FROM
THAT EXPRESSED IN THE POLICY.
Defendant's requested instructions, Nos. 3, 4, and 5,
none of which were given, and the failure to give of
which was objected to by the defendant, set forth the
standard that was in line with the language of the policy. The policy, as has been previously stated, required
the finding that there was no contributing health cause
in the death. It is quite apparent that the death was a
cancer death, or at least that the cancer contributed
thereto. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 3, required
an interrogatory type verdict which would have placed
the matter squarely on cancer or some other cause. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 4 required the jury
to made a finding that the death was caused by the accident before there could be any award outside of the
sum of $272.00 already tendered. Also it placed squarely
upon the jury the task of interpreting the contract of
insurance. Instruction No. 5 requested by the defendant
specifically set forth the death certificate as the prima
facie evidence of the cause of death and required a definite affirmative finding of any other cause of death
before there was any variation thereof. These requested
instructions are quite material when one finds in item
18 of the death certificate which is before the court as
defendant's Exhibit No. 3: "Cause of Death, Part I.
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Death was caused by: Immediate cause (a) Metastatic
Carcinoma, due to (b) Carcinoma of Lung" which in
evc1·yday language is "lung cancer," and then in Part II
the death certificate contains the following statement:'
"Other significant conditions contributing to death but
not related to the terminal disease condition given in
Part (a), and one finds that this particular portion was
left blank and not answered.
The trial court, however, in violation of request,
and in violation of the language of the policy, in its Instruction No. 4, in paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof, instructed
the jury as follows:
"You are instructed further that if you find from
a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's
deceased husband, Arthur Whitlock, died as a result of injuries received in such an accident and
where death occurred within thirty days of the
date of accident, where the said injuries so received
in the said accident materially and substantially
contributed to cause his death, then you should
find the plaintiff entitled to recover from the defendant under the policy provisions for the sum
and amount of $2,400.
"If on the other hand you cannot so find from the
preponderance of the evidence either that the plaintiff's deceased's husband died as a direct result of
injuries received in the accident, or that such death
did not occur within the thirty day period from the
date of the accident, or that the injuries received
in the accident did not materially and substantially
contribute to cause his death, then and in that event
you should find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant only for the hospital and
disability benefits."
The sum total of Instruction No. 4 as given by the
trid court changed the standard from that set forth in
t,'1e policy to the standard of materially and substantially contributing to the cause of the death, and turned
the matter "'ide open for jury speculation.
It is tu be noted that the jury was instructed without counsel being given an opportunity to read any in~;truc°dorn,, and after a request for a continuance until
mornin[;", by the defendant, said request being made at
5.~'5 111 the evening, the jury was instructed at 7:00 o'clock; the trial court was in an extreme hurry, and the
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instructions of the court were read without an opportunity of counsel to examine the instructions before
reading by the court. At the conclusion of the reading
of the instructions, but before argument, counsel asked
to approach the bench, and raised the question of Instruction No. 4 being in language different from that in
Lhe policy. The transcript of the testimony simply shows
that counsel approached the bench, on Line 2, Page
151. After the jury retired, a record was made of the
previous conversation at the bench before the argument.
On Page 152 at Line 8, the record was established: "I
wish to object, your Honor, as a matter of record and
lo make this a matter of record, that the instructions
were handed to counsel and given to the jury before
counsel had a chance to read them and that upon reading them and after they had been read to the Jury before the matter was argued, that the defendant raised
a question on Instruction Number 4, that it is not the
language of the contract and was misled--," whereupon
the court interrupted on Line 16 as follows: "This is
true, the record will show that Mr. Fenton and Mr. Burns
did come up to the bench and that the attention of the
Court was drawn with particularity to Instruction
Number 4 and particularly the last paragraph thereof.
I believe you pointed that out, Mr. Fenton." And on
Line 22 the answer is, "That's correct." The court thereupon continued on Line 23: "And at that time, you, I
believe, exhibited to me a photocopy, I presume it was,
of the Exhibit Number 1. Frankly, I had not read Exhibit
Number 1. I don't think that I read any of the exhibits,
for that matter, in total. In any event, I interrupted you."
Then the record continues on Line 29 of Page 152,
and on to Page 153, "And may the record also show that
your honor overruled counsel's objection to this Instruction Number 4 in the present form at that time." The
Court answered: "Yes, I did so." This amounts to the
sum total that the court failed to read the contract, instructed the jury, and failed to give counsel an opportunity to read the instructions before they were given
to the jury, and when the question of the variance was
rnised, refused to make an adjustment thereon, even
though the question of variance was raised before argument, which was the first opportunity counsel had
to raise any question as to the variance between the instructions and the contract.
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Utah law is quite clear that any time there is a question of an accident, with an existing disease, and the
existing disease, which cooperating with the accident,
results in injury or death, the accident is not the sole
cause or the cause independent of all other causes
within the meaning of an accident policy. Under these
conditions, we are now before the Court with the question of whether or not the accident, if any injury occurred therefrom, was the sole and existing cause of
death, and there is absolutely no proof that it was even
a contributing cause to the death. Under these conditions,
the action of the trial court in allowing the matter to
be speculated on with an erroneous instruction, certainly raised a presumption of prejudice on the part of
the court, and against the defendant. Utah law is quite
clear on the point pertaining to a policy of this nature.
A great deal of the law that has been written comes
under double indemnity clauses when the death is caused
by accident. Utah law holds that wherever there is a
double indemnity clause or a triple indemnity clause
in an insurance policy, in the event a death is caused
by accident, that the accident must be the sole cause
of the death, or the cause independent of all other
causes within the meaning of an accident policy, and
is the proper standard to apply to the matter before the
Court. Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States, 94 Utah 532, 72 Pac. 2d 1060, inso-.
far as the principal case is concerned a::d the rehearing
on same, found at 94 Utah 570, 80 Pac. 2d 348, sets forth
a very comprehensive discussion of this type of insurance policy. This takes in a situation where the accident is not the sole cause, but where it, together with
the disease, are cooperating causes of death, which
would be much more favorable to the plaintiff than the
case at hand, and comes up with the conclusion as follows:
"When at the time of an accident there was an existing disease, which cooperating with the accident
resulted in injury or death, the accident is not the
sole cause or the cause independent of all other
causes within the meaning of an accident policy."
This is much stronger than our case at hand. The
most favorable construction we could get from the testimony and the evidence from the stanrlpoint of the
plaintiff is that we have a death certificate that says
10

death was caused by cancer, and the report submitted
by the plaintiff in Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8, to the Company
indicate that i:Le death was caused by the cancer; then
in the later report, that the accident was a contributing cause, and the strongest the doctor would say about
signing the death certificate was that he meant to put
that the accident might have had something to do with
the death on the death certificate. This is quite different from the situation in the Brovvning case where there
was a bona fide question that the accident was not the
sole cause, and where it, together with the disease are
cooperating causes of death. In our case at hand, there
is no question.
In the case of Handley vs. Mutual Life Insurance
Company of New York, which can be found at 106 Utah
184, 147 P. 2d 319, the same doctrine is ratified, which
quotes the Browning case by the Utah State Supreme
Court. Also in the case of Tucker vs. New York Life
Insurance Company, 107 Utah 478, 155 P 2d 173, on
Page 482 in the Utah Report, The Utah State Supreme
Court, again in construing the language of the insurance
contract, referring to the Browning case, goes into three
classes of cases in which this situation arises, and a
quotation is as follows:
"When at the time of the accident there was an
existing disease which, cooperating with the accident, resulted in the injury or death, the accident
cannot be considered as the sole cause, or as the
cause independent of all other causes. Smith vs.
Federal Life Ins. Co., D. C., 6 f. 2d 283; Cretney v
Woodmen Acc. Co., 196 Wis. 29, 219 N. W. 448, 62
A. L. R. 675; Leland v Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N. E. 517,
520."
In all of the;:;e transactions, there is a far more favorable situation to the plaintiff than the case at hand. In
all of these cases there is a cooperating existing disease.
In the matter at bar, the most favorable we can say the
plaintiff's position is that the accident might have been
some contributing factor, and that until the lawsuit
was thought of, there was never an indication of the accident having anything to do with the death. It was
simply a case of death by cancer.
There is quite a revealing discussion in Corpus
Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum about the same def-
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inition, which endorses the action of the Utah Supreme
Court. They also approach it from a slightly different
standpoint, and in doing so again quote the Brovming
case. In 45 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 785 in Section
756 under Insurance pertaining to the proximate cause
of injury or death as a heading, in connection with
double indemnity and other cases of that nature, there
is the following quote:
"The accident must be the proximate cause of the
injury, disability, or death for which indemnity is
claimed, in order to hold the insurer liable therefor."
It goes on to express the thought that the accident must
be the proximate cause of the injury, disability, or death
for which the indemnity is claimed, and insurer cannot
be held liable if the accident was not the proximate
cause, or was only a remote cause, although the injury
was a result of insured's conduct as an intervening cause.
This is in language that is nearly as strong as the lanquage of the policy that is before the court at this time.
A footnote in citing the Browning vs. Equitable Life
Assurance case cited above, states that the accident
policy can have no broader meaning than the words
used in the policy, to-wit, "sole proximate cause" and
indicates that the death must be the exclusive result
of the accidental means.
It seems that under the circumstances, where the
court puts a jury on a different standard than the contract, where it is called to the court's attention before
argument, and exception is taken to the instruction
that does so, after argument, there is no question but
that the court was aware of the matter at the time and
refused to make any adjustment whatsoever, and that
under these conditions the court issued an instruction
against objection and put the determination of a case
concerning a contract on a different basis from that in
the contract. Said instruction put the finding on a preponderance of evidence basis, rather than on the language of the contract which was, "excluding any loss
or disability resulting directly or indirectly, in whole
or in part from any mental or bodily sickness or disease."
There can be no question but that this exclusion was
not complied with, and that the language of the court
placed the jury on a different standard.
In the case of Lee vs. New York Life Insurance
Company, 95 Utah 445, 82 P. 2d 178, the Supreme court
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of Utah differentiated between the Lee case and the
Browning case, by and for the reason that there was
conflicting testimony which the jury was justified in
believing. In the case at bar there is no conflicting testimony. There is no testimony whatsoever that goes
farther than Dr. Graff's. The most Dr. Graff could say
was that the accident might have contributed to the
death. Under these conditrons, the case at bar is parallel
with the Browning case. Nor does this conflict with the
principle of the Browning case which takes the position that an insured, to bring himself under the benefits of the policy, after an accident has the affirmative
duty of bringing himself under the terms of the policy.
In the case of Tucker vs. New York Life Insurance
Company, 107 Utah 478, 155 P. 2d 173, cited above, the
Browning case is endorsed by the Utah State Supreme
Court, and on Page 482, in discussing the three types of
cases in which the court has to make the decision, and
referring to the Browning case, and quoting from the
Browning case, Classification (3) is as follows:
"When at the time of the accident, there was an
existing disease which, cooperating with the accident, resulted in the injury or death, the accident
cannot be considered as the sole cause, or the cause
independent of all other causes."
Thereafter, there is a long list of citations. This is particularly interesting, in view of the circumstances as
we have in the case at bar, in which the strongest interpretation that can possibly be put upon Dr. Graff's language is that the accident may have been a contributing cause. However, at no time has Dr. Graff eliminated
the fact that the cancer was the cause of death, or at
least was a contributing cause, and under those circumstances this accident cannot be considered as the sole
cause, or the cause independent of all other causes, under the interpretations of the Tucker case under any
condition. Especially is this true when one becomes
aware that everyone was simply waiting for Mr. Whitlock to die from cancer.
Point III
PLAINTIFF'S PROOF FAILED TO SHOW THAT
THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS COVERED BY POLICY.
Under the most liberal construction that can be
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placed on the policy and Dr. Graff's testimony, there is
no question that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden
of proving that the accident was the cause of death.
There is no question that the most liberal interpretation that can be put on plaintiff's proof is that a bodily
sickness or disease at least contributed to the death.
Although no autopsy was performed, and the doctor stated he could not be sure what was the cause of death
without same, it was quite apparent from the doctor's
testimony that in all probability if plaintiff had desired,
she could have had the body exhumed, and could have
provided more definite information. This was entirely
under plaintiff's control, and when they did not do so,
they abandoned any claim to rights under the particular
policy, that might have been shown by an autopsy. It
is the plaintiff's duty to provide the proofs under these
circumstances. This is especially true, considering that
the body is under the control of the plaintiff. Bearing in
mind that on the official records the death was from
cancer, there is no reason for payment of the insurance
under this loss of life provision until such time as affirmative proof is provided by the plaintiff otherwise.
This has not been done, and the plaintiff has failed in
her duty of proof, regardless of the trial court's instructions. Based upon the standards as set forth in the Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, as cited above, the Handley vs. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, and the Tucker vs. New
York Life Insurance Company, and the principles of the
Utah Supreme Court as set forth in the Browning vs.
Equitable Life Assurance Case, and implemented by
the other cases, all to the effect that until such time as
the plaintiff proves that the accident was the sole cause
of death, there should be no payment under a policy
of this nature, and the trial court and the jury both erred
in connection with the trial of this matter. Defendant's
requested Instruction No. 2 should have been given to
the jury by the trial court, to-wit, "No cause of action."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the defendant-appellant is of the
opinion that the trial court erred, and has shown bias
and prejudice in that its Instruction Number 4 as given
to the jury set the matter up on a standard of matcriall)
and substantially contributing to the cause of death. This
defendant-appellant is further of the opinion that there

14

was no proof offered whatsoever that would justify a
decision under any circumstances in favor of the plaintiff. Under these conditions, it is the contention of this
defendant-appellant that this matter should be reversed;
that the $272.00 that was tendered to the plaintiff by
the defendant-appellant shortly after the death should
be awarded to Mrs. Whitlock without interest, and that
from this amount there should be deducted the defendant-appellant's court costs and cost of appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
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